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Introduction: Non-communicable diseases strongly linked to lifestyle factors create an increasing 
burden of disease.  Fiscal interventions (tax and subsidy) are one approach to improving lifestyles 
but their effective design might be improved. 
Economic framework: Conventional economic theory suggests that fiscal interventions are only used 
to correct prices for externalities (costs or benefits imposed on others). These can be difficult to 
calculate accurately.  Fiscal interventions operate by altering the prices that consumers face.  Price 
increases are predicted to reduce demand and the size of the effect is measured by the price 
elasticity. Tax changes may not translate directly into price changes, however. 
Evidence for the effect of taxes, subsidies and prices: There is strong evidence for the effectiveness 
of taxation in relation to reducing tobacco and alcohol consumption and resulting harms.  There has 
been less evaluation of taxation in relation to other unhealthy behaviours or of subsidies to promote 
healthy behaviours. 
Discussion: Fiscal levers have been used as interventions to improve health rather than for market 
correction.  Taking account of behavioural insights may improve the design of fiscal interventions 
and combining interventions may increase effectiveness. 
Conclusion: Both types of intervention have a role in improving health but there may be challenges 
in promoting uptake of healthy behaviours. 
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Taxes and subsidies to promote healthier choices: how well do they work and what are the 
alternatives?  
Introduction 
Non-communicable diseases (NCDs) such as cancer, heart disease, stroke and diabetes are amongst 
the leading causes of morbidity and mortality in higher income countries and increasingly in low and 
middle income countries1  and their prevalence is strongly linked to lifestyle factors including diet, 
sedentary behaviour, smoking and alcohol.  In the UK, the mortality rate from some NCDs, particularly 
heart disease has been falling, but they remain the leading cause of death and there is an increasing 
burden of disease as people live longer in ill health.   
There are many factors which contribute to unhealthy lifestyles; individuals make choices about what 
to consume but these choices are shaped and constrained by their life circumstances and 
environmental factors.  There is a general consensus that action is required across a broad range of 
causes and settings that contribute to unhealthy lifestyles.  However, this paper focuses principally on 
an economic perspective of the role of fiscal interventions (taxes and subsidies) and other price based 
policies in promoting healthier choices.   
This is not intended to imply that this is the either the best or the only way to address health 
behaviours, or that individual health behaviour is the only factor that should be addressed.  In the 
discussion, it is argued that the formation of policy should consider a broad range of effective 
interventions, including smarter fiscal interventions and other price based policies, and take account 
of the relative costs and benefits of individual interventions as well as the combined efficiency of 
multiple interventions.   
The next section outlines the economic framework which underpins the application of taxes, subsidies 
or other price-based interventions.  This is followed by a  focussed review of the evidence relating to 
health behaviours which is intended to provide an insight into the different challenges posed by the 
varying characteristics of the behaviours and the different nature of the economic decisions that are 
involved.  The discussion considers how the effectiveness of fiscal interventions and price based 
policies might be improved as well as their role in relation to other potential economic interventions. 
 
Economic framework  
(i) Consumer perspective 
The underlying model for the economics of consumer choice assumes that individuals behave as if 
they are allocating limited resources (time and money) across a range of goods and services such that 
the benefit they receive is maximised, based on the cost to them of acquiring the goods and services.  
Individual preferences are taken as a given and these preferences are complete and stable over time.  
Consumers are assumed to act rationally and to know what is in their best interest, making decisions 
accordingly.  This is the principle of consumer sovereignty.  Clearly, the real world does not conform 
exactly to this model and this is explicitly recognised in the phrase ‘as if’ above.  The strength of this 
or any model lies in its ability to make reasonably accurate and testable predictions of what will 
happen when conditions change. 
Within the given parameters, the economic model can predict how the use of any price based 
intervention, including taxes or subsidies, will affect demand for a particular product or service.  The 
direct effect of a price increase (decrease) on any good is to reduce (increase) purchases of that good 
(and any complementary products) and increase (reduce) purchases of goods which are substitutes.  
One practical difficulty in relation to the goods or activities relating to health behaviour is that these 
are typically classes of goods or activities and consumers can maintain a higher level of consumption 
by substituting within a product category; for example, switching to a cheaper brand of alcohol or 
tobacco.  This phenomenon is known as trading down and implies that, from a public health policy 
perspective, the lowest prices any particular market are important. 
The economic measure of the effect of a tax or other price change can be expressed through the price 
elasticity; this is the ratio of the change in quantity to the change in price.  If a 10% increase in price 
reduces the quantity bought by 5% the price elasticity is -0.5.  Price elasticities are almost always 
negative (price increases reduce quantity purchased).  If the price elasticity is between 0 and -1 then 
demand is described as inelastic; that is the quantity purchased falls by a smaller percentage than the 
price increase.  All other goods with a negative price elasticity have demand that is elastic. Price 
elasticities vary considerably across goods related to health behaviours, across time and across 
countries, and depending on the estimation methods and data sources used.  Estimates will also vary 
when there are differences or changes in the use of other policies to promote healthy behaviour.  In 
some cases these could reinforce the price effect; for example a media campaign coinciding with a 
price change.  In other cases there may be reverse effect; for example, the use of licensing restrictions 
to regulate access to alcohol or tobacco can create a higher time cost, making money price relatively 
less important than in settings where access is less restricted.   
The consistent finding, however, is that price elasticities are negative and therefore a tax (subsidy) on 
unhealthy (healthy) goods, leading to a price increase (reduction), will reduce (increase) the quantity 
purchased, all other things being equal.  One of the things that may not remain equal is household 
income; if incomes increase more rapidly than the price of unhealthy goods then this will make them 
more affordable and dilute any effect of a tax increase.  Thus, it is the real terms price change (adjusted 
for income) that determines the impact of a tax or subsidy.  Note that a change in tax or subsidy also 
has an indirect effect on real income. 
For a health behaviour such as smoking, where quitting confers more health benefits than cutting 
down, it is also possible to estimate the effect of tax changes (the tax elasticity of quitting) with 
appropriate data2.  Similarly, the effect on smoking initiation can also be estimated. 
(ii) Producer perspective 
Although the consumer or purchaser of goods and services is most often seen as the focus for 
government fiscal interventions, and is generally given the most attention in the discussion of taxes 
or subsidies, these can also be directed towards changing producer behaviour.  Determining the target 
or subject of a tax or subsidy is one feature of designing a fiscal intervention3 and in some contexts 
intervening with producers may be a more efficient approach.  A brief consideration of the producer 
or supply side of the market, and their potential role in determining what is supplied and at what price, 
follows. 
In the basic economic model, consumers are price-takers; i.e. they respond to whatever price is set by 
the market.  This model also assumes that there are many firms competing to supply a particular good 
or service, which has identical characteristics, and this process of competition will determine the 
market price.  As with the consumer side of the market, this model abstracts from reality to provide a 
starting point for analysing producer behaviour.  Just as maximising utility is taken to be the aim of 
consumer behaviour, profit-maximising is the aim of producer behaviour.  In order to achieve this, 
producers have to be cost-minimisers, in the sense that they produce a specified good efficiently.  If 
costs are reduced by changing quality then this is, in effect, a different good.  Producers will, therefore, 
respond to changes in the costs that they face, just as consumers respond to price changes.  Thus, 
fiscal interventions on the producer side of the market have the potential to change what is consumed. 
(iii) Intervening in the market 
Within the economic model outlined, intervention can be justified where there is deviation from the 
conditions of perfect competition and this occurs rather frequently.  Externalities provide one such 
justification.  External costs (or benefits) arise when costs (or benefits) accrue to others in society and 
are not taken into account in the market.  This provides the main economic justification for taxing 
harmful goods or subsidising beneficial ones. 
In strict economic terms, the tax or subsidy should be set at a level that equates the private cost 
(benefit) with the social cost (benefit) at the margin, that is to say measured on the last unit purchased, 
sometimes referred to as a Pigouvian tax4.  This approach faces a number of difficulties, not least of 
which is calculating the external cost where there can be considerable debate about what counts as 
an external cost as well as how to measure it5.  Even if the external cost can be agreed, the relationship 
between consumption of an unhealthy product and the resulting harms is not necessarily linear.  
Taking alcohol as an example, health risks are not linear and other harms, including anti-social 
behaviour, may only arise with excessive consumption.  The optimal tax might be one which increases 
with consumption and this seems impractical. 
The focus of these debates has been almost exclusively based on considering the externalities as 
arising from consumer decisions rather than producer decisions.  Whilst producers will argue that they 
respond to consumer demand, production decisions such as whether to produce a more or less 
healthy version of a particular good will not take account of potential external costs or benefits.  They 
will take account of whether there are different input costs and what the effect will be on demand for 
the product.  From an economic perspective, it is just as valid to tax or subsidise inputs to the 
production process that generate the externalities that arise from the consumption of the product.  
Whilst the increase or reduction in production cost will be reflected in the final price to consumers, 
this approach provides an incentive for producers to reformulate products. 
If the existence of external costs (or benefits) provide an economic rationale for intervening in 
markets, other major challenges to the conventional economic model come from the recognition that 
individuals are not always fully informed, particularly when faced with many alternatives, and 
preferences may not be complete or consistent, particularly over time.  Imperfections also exist on 
the producer side of the market.  Competition may be limited by the concentration of production or 
retailing in large companies.  Various forms of product promotion may be used to increase sales.  
Lower prices for larger sizes (volume discounts) may be justified by economies of scale (lower costs) 
in production but will increase purchasing and, potentially, the amount consumed per occasion.  This 
is particularly true in relation to low price offers to upgrade portion size or add side dishes to a meal. 
The very complexity of real world decision making may lead to consumers using short cuts (decision 
heuristics) when taking decisions and the implications of this for fiscal interventions will be picked up 
in the discussion.   
Evidence for the effect of taxes, subsidies and prices. 
The relevance and impact of fiscal instruments in advancing public health goals has been varied and 
depends to a certain extent on characteristics of the health behaviour being addressed and the object 
(good or activity) to which the fiscal instrument is applied.  In this section, an overview of evidence is 
presented for different health behaviours which exemplify some of the different challenges they pose. 
(i) Smoking 
There has been widespread use of taxation, over an extended period of time, to address smoking 
behaviour.  Substantial levels of taxation have been applied to tobacco in the UK, partly as a revenue 
raising activity but increasingly as a public health measure, as the evidence of health and social harms 
has accumulated.  Currently, the tax on a typical packet of 20 cigarettes can account for around 80% 
of the selling price and comprises a flat duty of £4.57 plus 16.5% of the retail price plus value added 
tax (VAT) of 20%.  As a result, there has been considerable impact on affordability and this has 
contributed to reduction in consumption.  It should also be noted that the flat rate element of the tax 
ensures that the percentage tax is higher on cheaper products, which means that the affordability of 
the cheapest product is affected most by the tax.   
Tobacco has become 40% less affordable in the UK since 1980; much of this effect has been 
concentrated in the more recent period between 2006 and 2016 when tobacco became 27% less 
affordable6.  Increasing tax rates may not in itself ensure that tobacco products become less affordable 
as this may be affected by the response of producers or retailers.  Whilst evidence from the US7 
suggests that cigarette taxes are over-shifted (prices to consumers increase by more than the tax), in 
the UK part of recent tax increases have been absorbed by producers or retailers resulting in under-
shifting particularly for cheaper products8.   
Smoking prevalence has fallen steadily in the UK from around 40% in 1980 to 16% in 20169.  Accurately 
measuring the impact of tax policy on health behaviours is confounded by the coterminous use of 
several policy instruments.  Thus tobacco control policy in the UK has not relied solely on tax measures 
but an array of interventions including public health information, individual support for smoking 
cessation (including the development of NRT and other products to reduce craving), regulation of 
advertising including at point of sale and most recently plain packaging.  However, Forster and Jones2 
estimated a tax elasticity of quitting of -0.6 for men and -0.46 women using British data from 1984, 
which would predate much of the increase in use of other interventions.  These figures are interpreted 
as years of smoking avoided as a result of quitting; thus a 10% real increase in tax would, on average, 
produce a 6 year reduction in years of smoking by men.  Furthermore, it is estimated that doubling 
the price of tobacco in real terms worldwide would reduce prevalence of smoking by a third10. 
(ii) Alcohol consumption 
Alcohol consumption shares some characteristics with smoking but also some differences.  Both 
behaviours can be considered non-essential; i.e. it is not necessary for anyone to smoke or drink 
alcohol.  However, whilst there are clear health risks associated with any smoking there is less 
consensus about health risks associated with any consumption of alcohol as opposed to excessive 
consumption of alcohol.  A large majority of the adult population consume some alcohol whereas 
smokers are a decreasing minority.  However, clear associations have been shown between tax levels 
and health harms from alcohol11,12. 
There is a long history of taxing alcohol as a revenue raising mechanism but the focus on tax as a public 
health measure is more recent.  UK taxation of alcohol is complex; whilst VAT is levied uniformly at 
20%, alcohol duty rates are applied differently to different products and are not directly based on 
alcoholic strength, resulting in a tax rate per unit of alcohol that varies both between products and, in 
some cases, within products.  Spirits are the only product where duty is proportional to alcoholic 
strength and is currently 28.74p per unit of alcohol.  However, the duty per unit on the lowest strength 
of still cider would be nearly the same (27p per unit) whereas duty on strong cider would be only 7-
8p; this is because cider is taxed on the volume of product, within bands, and not on the volume of 
alcohol. 
In contrast with the situation with smoking, alcohol has become 60% more affordable since 1980, 
despite tax increases13, although the increase in affordability has reversed more recently.  Alcohol 
consumption has begun to fall more recently; the volume of alcohol released for sale per adult in the 
UK peaked in 2004/514 whereas the increase in affordability peaked a little later in 200713.  This more 
recent reduction in the affordability of alcohol in the UK owes more to falling real incomes than to 
higher taxation.  One reason for the increase in affordability, particularly with respect to alcohol sold 
for home consumption (off-sales), has been the failure to pass on tax increases15, with supermarkets 
often promoting alcohol products as loss leaders, with the aim of increasing footfall and overall sales.  
Legislation has been introduced to prevent ‘below cost’ selling; i.e. alcohol cannot be sold for less than 
the combined duty and VAT payable.  However, products can still be sold for less than their true cost. 
It was in response to the specific problem of very cheap alcohol fuelling problem drinking that the 
Scottish Government passed legislation in 2012 to allow the introduction of a different type of price 
intervention; minimum unit pricing (MUP) per unit alcohol.  This establishes a ‘floor’ price across all 
types of alcohol product below which alcohol cannot be sold.  The relative effectiveness of increasing 
the lowest prices in the alcohol market, compared with increasing the average price, had been 
demonstrated by Gruenewald et al16.  It was shown that a price increase targeting lower cost products 
would reduce the volume of alcohol sold by 4.2% compared with a reduction in sales of 1.7% when 
prices increased across all products.  Some Canadian provinces operate a similar policy of Social 
Reference Pricing; increasing this minimum price has been shown to be associated with reductions in 
alcohol consumption and alcohol-related health harms17,18.  Legal challenges delayed the introduction 
of MUP until 2018 and the effects are currently being evaluated.  However, modelling of the policy’s 
effect on problem drinking suggests it will be more effective than large tax increases in reducing 
alcohol consumption by the heaviest drinkers19. 
MUP cannot be described as a fiscal intervention but it is a price based intervention that affects the 
supply of alcohol products.  Scotland had previously introduced other restrictions on ‘irresponsible’ 
price promotions, which were defined as those which would potentially encourage increased alcohol 
consumption over a period of time.  This was initially targeted at ‘happy hour’ offers and other short 
term price reductions within licensed premises but was later extended to all volume based price 
discounts.  Again, this is aimed at restricting some aspects of price setting on the supply side of the 
market where these have been associated with adverse drinking behaviour. 
(iii) Food taxes and subsidies 
Moving into the area of food and healthy diets provides different challenges for policymakers when 
compared with smoking and alcohol.  Food is an essential commodity and the challenge is to 
implement taxes, subsidies or other price interventions that will promote healthier choices without 
causing potential hardship to low income groups.  The aim of fiscal interventions should be to achieve 
a healthy diet through increasing the consumption of healthy foods, reducing the consumption of 
unhealthy foods and reducing excessive calorie intake.  Healthy foods include those which are less 
processed and are high in fibre and important nutrients such as fish oils.  Unhealthy foods are those 
which are high in fat, sugar and salt and usually highly processed and energy dense.  In this context it 
is particularly important to consider what is to be taxed or subsidised but also how the tax is to be 
applied.  Taxes or subsidies could be applied to particular foods, to particular nutrients or could be 
applied on the basis of calorie content or energy density3. 
Most evidence in this area relates to the effect of interventions aimed at directly increasing prices paid 
by consumers for specific products.  Recently, however, attention has been shifting to other uses of 
taxation which may be more suitable for the complexities of improving diets.  Taxes which target 
nutrients rather than products may be more effective2 and if these are taxed as inputs to food 
production may induce behaviour change in producers.  The soft drink industry levy, which was  
introduced in the UK from April 2018, targets the sugar content of certain sugar sweetened beverages 
(SSBs). 
The tax is levied on producers of soft drinks based on their production of soft drinks within 2 bands of 
sugar content, with a zero levy for drinks containing less than 5 grams of sugar per 100 millilitres.  A 
stated aim of this policy was to encourage reformulation of soft drinks with a clear incentive for 
producers to reduce sugar content to avoid or reduce the tax.  In this respect the levy has been 
successful with the government reporting that more than 50% of manufacturers had reformulated 
drinks21.  However, the decision on whether to pass on the levy to customers, in part or in full, by 
charging higher prices for drinks with a higher sugar content is left in the hands of the suppliers 
(producers and retailers). 
The most obvious marker of the health issues relating to food intake is the increased prevalence of 
obesity22, which almost doubled from 15% of adults in 1993 to 26% in 2016.  This is, of course, also 
related to increasingly sedentary lifestyles (see (iv) below).  Considering general price trends, until 
relatively recently food was becoming more affordable in the UK.  Food prices fell in real terms by 
nearly 30% from 1980 to 200723.  This was followed by a sharp increase in prices as a fall in real incomes 
combined with increasing prices; real prices began to fall again from 2014.  The effect of this natural 
change in the affordability of food reveals interesting evidence about consumer responses, with 
consumption of relatively unhealthy food categories being protected, partly by trading down to 
cheaper alternatives, and consumption of fruit and vegetables, falling23. 
There have been relatively few evaluations of implemented tax initiatives relating to unhealthy foods 
although there have been many modelling studies based on price elasticity data.  A recent review 
(Marron et al 2015), specifically relating to taxation of unhealthy food and drink, suggests that well-
designed taxes may be helpful but the evidence to date is rather limited24.  In particular, more 
evidence is required both on substitution effects and on the response of food industry25.  Substitution 
effects will not necessarily undermine specific food taxes26 but need to be carefully considered. 
The most frequent target for taxation has been sugar sweetened beverages (SSBs) and mixed results 
have been reported.  Very small taxes, mainly as a revenue raising device, produce limited effects.  
Collins et al27 estimated that a 10% price increase would reduce SSB consumption in the UK by 4.6% 
and a 20% price increase would reduce consumption by 9.1%.  Evaluation of an 8% tax on non-essential 
foods in Mexico28 indicates that the effect of the tax in reducing purchases increased over time (year 
2 compared to year 1 post tax) and that the effect was concentrated in households defined as 
unhealthy purchasers pre-tax.  In Hungary, taxing unhealthy foods produced a shift from processed to 
unprocessed foods, with the lowest income groups being the most responsive29.  Although the tax on 
fat in Denmark was short-lived, it did impact on household purchases30,31.   
Rather less evidence is available on the potential effect of subsidies for healthy eating, although these 
are included in some modelling studies.  Specific interventions to promote healthier eating have 
tended to take the form of vouchers for fruit and vegetable purchases usually targeted at low income 
households.  The UK Healthy Start scheme, for example, increased expenditure on fruit and vegetables 
by 15%32.  These are not strictly a fiscal measure as they are a form of income supplement, reducing 
the price of voucher purchases to zero and potentially freeing income to spend on other things.  
However, insights from behavioural economics suggest that there is a tendency for consumers to 
earmark money for specific purposes (known as mental accounting) such that food vouchers will 
increase total food expenditure33.  In the Healthy Start scheme, expenditure only increased amongst 
recipients who previously spent less than the voucher value32. 
(iv) Physical activity 
Using taxes, subsidies or price-based interventions to increase physical activity presents a different 
set of challenges when compared with the other health behaviours considered previously.  Apart from 
some extreme exceptions, everyone spends some time in some level of physical activity and is 
sedentary for some time.  Whilst shifting the balance towards greater physical activity may involve 
financial costs for some activities, the main cost to individuals may be time costs, which have been 
shown to be a greater barrier to physical activity than monetary costs34.  Physical activity required in 
the workplace, which could be considered as physically active time which was being paid for, has 
declined over time.   
There is very limited evidence relating to the use of taxes, subsidies or price-based interventions 
relating to physical activity and sedentary behaviour.  A systematic review35 identified just 13 papers 
and this included evaluations of transfer payments and the effect of congestion charging, where there 
would be an indirect effect of improving the environment for active travel.   
Subsidies to public transport could also be seen as promoting active travel but are primarily aimed at 
meeting other policy objectives.  In Canada, schemes to provide tax credits or refunds for enrolling 
children in physical activity programmes and exemptions from sales tax for sports related goods have 
been introduced at federal and provincial levels36 but do not appear to have been evaluated in terms 
of increased physical activity. 
Discussion 
From the perspective of economics, the most controversial aspect of any intervention in the market 
is the potential violation of consumer sovereignty.  The economic principle underlying fiscal 
interventions is that they should be market correcting; i.e. they should ensure that the prices 
consumers face reflect the social cost of their choices.  In practice, the optimal level of tax or subsidy 
can be difficult to determine and fiscal interventions are more often judged on their effectiveness in 
reducing health and social harms and promoting positive health and social outcomes.  There is a strong 
argument that the choice of interventions to promote health should be based on the costs and 
benefits to society, including the individuals whose choices are affected.  The best interventions, or 
combination of interventions, would have the highest ratio of benefits to costs. 
The available evidence relating to fiscal levers is variable across different health behaviours.  Far more 
use has been made of taxation for tobacco and alcohol than for diet and physical activity, partly 
reflecting the greater complexity of these latter behaviours and partly the fact that they are so 
embedded in daily activity.  Levels of taxation for tobacco have been kept sufficiently high to reduce 
affordability and make a contribution to reducing smoking prevalence.  However, alcohol has until 
recently become more affordable as tax increases have not kept pace with real incomes.  Different 
approaches to targeting the cheapest alcohol products are now being evaluated. 
Fiscal levers aim to alter the prices that consumers face but cost includes other factors particularly 
time.  Convenience foods, which free up time from food preparation but may be energy dense, have 
played a part in fuelling the increase in obesity.  So too has the increasing availability of food outside 
the home.  Whilst the underlying economic principle, that higher prices will reduce demand, will hold, 
the scale of effect is less predictable.  Other interventions apart from fiscal policy can increase the 
non-monetary cost of unhealthy behaviours, for example regulations that impact on availability of 
unhealthy products increase the time and effort involved in acquiring them.  
Smarter design of fiscal instruments could provide more effective interventions.  Ensuring that 
affordability is taken into account is one of the principles suggested for ‘smart’ taxation37.  In relation 
to food, taxes (or subsidies) that give manufacturers incentives to reformulate products may have 
greater impact than taxes applied directly to the products.  The design of fiscal interventions also 
needs to be informed by consideration of potential behavioural responses; particularly the likelihood 
that some consumers will switch to cheaper versions of the same foods, which may be even less 
healthy. 
Behavioural economics uses insights from psychology to investigate the systematic biases in decision 
making that cannot be addressed satisfactorily within the conventional model.  Within this model, the 
failure of individuals to follow their own best interests has been described as an ‘internality’ or within-
person externality38,39 but there is considerable debate within economics over who decides what the 
better choice is when assisting individuals to make better choices and the value judgments this 
implies.  However, there is potential for behavioural economics to contribute to the design of better 
interventions. 
Perhaps one of the most important insights from behavioural economics is that consumers apply short 
cuts when facing complex decisions and these short cuts produce systematic bias.  For example, status 
quo bias suggests consumers are more likely to choose the same foods or familiar foods rather than 
consider all the alternatives.  Introducing a fiscal intervention may then be less effective unless the 
consumer is aware of the price change.  If the consumer is unaware of the price change then the 
intervention is not salient to their decision-making.  Decision-making can also be affected by context 
or feelings (the affect heuristic); for example, consumers make a different, less healthy, food choice 
when they are feeling hungry.  It has been suggested that this bias could be addressed by per-
commitment devices such as pre-ordering lunch at school or in work places.   
Interventions to address these and other potential biases in decision making have been popularised 
as ‘nudges’40.  However, the most successful examples of applications tend to be those where there is 
an obvious ‘default’ choice which can be reset41.  There is, however, potential for a broader range of 
applications of behavioural interventions that go beyond nudging.  Galizzi42 proposes clusters of policy 
formulation instruments where tax and subsidy and nudges are seen, respectively, as purely 
conventional and purely behavioural.  However, the use of information and incentives can be 
conventional or behaviourally inspired.  These clusters can also be debated but the principle, that 
there is potential overlap or symbiosis between conventional and behavioural approaches appears 
sound.  This awareness may lead to better design of interventions. 
Equity considerations are also a factor when considering the role of fiscal instruments. , particularly 
as attention moves beyond the so called ‘sin taxes’ on tobacco and alcohol.  Food taxation might be 
limited to discretionary or treat items but would limit their scope considerably whilst still having 
potentially adverse effects on low income households.  Subsidising healthy foods could offset the 
higher costs of taxed foods but if applied across the board could be more beneficial to higher income 
households.   
Conclusion 
The use of tax (or subsidy) to affect individual choice has sometimes been described as a shove, rather 
than a nudge “[b]ut, though nudges certainly have their place, occasionally a good shove advances 
individual and social welfare considerably more.”43  Debate around conventional approaches and 
behavioural approaches to health behaviours will no doubt continue, both from the perspective of 
adherence to economic principles and in terms of effectiveness in reducing health harms and other 
social costs.  There is clearly scope for a middle-ground based on what works in a particular context 
and for designing better interventions by incorporating conventional and behavioural perspective.  
The greatest challenges may lie in developing effective interventions where the emphasis is on 
increasing healthy choices through subsidies or nudges.   
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